China appears to be employing a strategy of "weaponising" its trading relationships with EU member states, using them as an opportunity to exert economic and strategic influence over a weaker rival. The Dutch government's audacious move to take over Nexperia, a Chinese-owned chip factory, highlighted the risks associated with Europe's asymmetric relationship with China.
Beijing has agreed to ease restrictions on automotive chip supplies to the EU, but only for a 12-month period, leaving the door open for future action. This temporary reprieve is unlikely to alleviate concerns about China's long-term intentions. The ongoing trade deficit of β¬300 billion in China's favour and the bloc's inability to stem imports using tariffs have created an imbalance that benefits Beijing.
The EU's de-risking policy from China has been criticized as inadequate, with some arguing it amounts to "de-risking" rather than truly decoupling from the Chinese economy. This approach is seen as insufficient by many, including former China adviser Andrew Small, who believes Europe is entering a period of rolling crises and that things have crossed a threshold with China.
China's aggressive tactics include forcing European manufacturers to hand over sensitive business information in exchange for rare earths or magnets needed for critical industries like the automotive sector. This highlights the risks associated with relying on China for strategic materials and underscores the need for EU member states to diversify their supply chains.
The situation has sparked concerns about the EU's ability to defend its interests against Chinese economic coercion. While some, like French President Emmanuel Macron, are pushing for a more robust response, including the use of the EU's anti-coercion instrument (ACI), others in Germany and beyond are hesitant due to concerns about retaliation and the devastating impact on the economy.
The reality is that decoupling from China is not as simple as some would like. The EU lacks operational rare-earth mines, and it could take 10 years for Europe to replicate what China has achieved by buying up or controlling the entire supply chain. Meanwhile, China controls 96% of the world's magnet supply, leaving the EU with limited options.
As tensions between the EU and China continue to escalate, Brussels and Paris are facing a stark choice: either accept China's growing economic influence or take bold action to defend their interests. The clock is ticking, and Europe's ability to withstand China's "economic coercion" will be put to the test in the months ahead.
Beijing has agreed to ease restrictions on automotive chip supplies to the EU, but only for a 12-month period, leaving the door open for future action. This temporary reprieve is unlikely to alleviate concerns about China's long-term intentions. The ongoing trade deficit of β¬300 billion in China's favour and the bloc's inability to stem imports using tariffs have created an imbalance that benefits Beijing.
The EU's de-risking policy from China has been criticized as inadequate, with some arguing it amounts to "de-risking" rather than truly decoupling from the Chinese economy. This approach is seen as insufficient by many, including former China adviser Andrew Small, who believes Europe is entering a period of rolling crises and that things have crossed a threshold with China.
China's aggressive tactics include forcing European manufacturers to hand over sensitive business information in exchange for rare earths or magnets needed for critical industries like the automotive sector. This highlights the risks associated with relying on China for strategic materials and underscores the need for EU member states to diversify their supply chains.
The situation has sparked concerns about the EU's ability to defend its interests against Chinese economic coercion. While some, like French President Emmanuel Macron, are pushing for a more robust response, including the use of the EU's anti-coercion instrument (ACI), others in Germany and beyond are hesitant due to concerns about retaliation and the devastating impact on the economy.
The reality is that decoupling from China is not as simple as some would like. The EU lacks operational rare-earth mines, and it could take 10 years for Europe to replicate what China has achieved by buying up or controlling the entire supply chain. Meanwhile, China controls 96% of the world's magnet supply, leaving the EU with limited options.
As tensions between the EU and China continue to escalate, Brussels and Paris are facing a stark choice: either accept China's growing economic influence or take bold action to defend their interests. The clock is ticking, and Europe's ability to withstand China's "economic coercion" will be put to the test in the months ahead.